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PROBL EM S WITH GRAHAM'S
TWO-SYSTEMS HYPOTHESIS
OWEN GOLDIN

I NAn'stotle's Two Systems' Daniel Graham has put forwa rd a bold new
hypothesis concernin g the developme nt of Aristotle's thought, which
he labels 'the Two System s Hypothesis'. Gra~am recognizes that the
interpreter of Aristotle faced with conflicting doctrines sometimes has
no recourse but to posit a development in Aristotle's thought. But, with
the notable exception of the speculations of Owen, 2 Graham finds
previous developmental accounts of Aristotle's thought philosophically
unsatisfactory. This is because genetic accounts (like those ofJaeger)J
have typically explained changes in Aristotelia n doctrine on the basis of
a shift in general outlook, not on Aristotle's attempts as a philosopher
to resolve tensions arising in his earlier views. Graham's book is an
attempt to give a developmental accou nt of Aristotle's thought in
metaphysics and philosophy of science without this shortcoming.
Graham argues that Aristotle's positing of matter was motivated by
the failure of his earlier ontology to allow one to account for substantial
change and that the analysis of substa nce as a composite of matter and
form is structured by the model of the activity of a craftsman. Graham
shows how the theory of the four causes as it is presented in Physics 2 is
also structured by this model and how the potentiality/actuality
distinction was extended to apply to Aristotle's new understanding
of substantial change. Graham's a~ccount both explains apparent
discrepancies in Aristotle's views and shows why Aristotle was
1

(Oxford, 1987).
Sec G. E. L. Owen, ' L ogic ami Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle', in
l. During and G. E. L. Owen (cds.), 11 ristolle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Cent my
(Goteborg, 1960), and 'The Platonism of Aristotle', Proceedings t{the A ristoteliau Society,
1

89 <•96s), 125-so.
1

See W. Jaeger, A ristotle: Fundamenlttls
R. Robinson, 2nd edn ., (Oxford, J9-t8).

t~/

the His/my of his Del:elopmenl, trans.
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philosophically impelled to change his views in the manner in which he
did. There is much of value here, and Graham's speculations are
worthy of close consideration. But here I shall restrict myself to just
one of Graham's basic points, that which is announced in his book's
very title: the hypothesis that in Aristotle's writin gs we find two
complete, independent, and contradictory philosophical systems, each
with its own onto~ogy and theory of scientific explanation.
T he aspect of this thesis that is bound to be the most controversial is
the contention that Aristotle's first system (S ,), found in the Organon,
is not only different from, but fundamentaUy contradicts his second
system (S 2 ) , which dominates the rest of Aristotle's work. In Graham's
view there is 'a fault line running down the middle of Aristotle's
philosophy' (p. viii). H e argues that Aristotle never recognized that his
philosophical thought underwent such a radical shift, and hence at
times imports the obsolete principles of S, into the philosophical
speculations of S 2 • Graham suggests that this is bound to cause
trouble, since at these times Aristotle's conceptual framework rests on
a set of contradictory principles. Graham leads up to an analysis of
the metaphysical puzzles of Metaph;,sics Z, which he takes to
be a manifestation of the philosophical confusions that arise from
Aristotle's holding contradictory principles. According to Graham's
analysis, Aristotle knows that he is in troubl e, but does not know
the solution-which would be to cut the problem out by the roots,
i.e. eliminate the principles of S 1 from his thought. In the penultimate chapter of Aristotle's Tmo Systems Graham shows 'what Aristotle
should have said' by sketching the metaphysics of a consistent
version of S 2 .
•
Although I am persuaded by the general outline of Graham's
developmental account, I believe that his analysis of the logical relation
between sI and s2is flawed, and that the difficulties of Metaph)ISics z
are deeper than Graham suggests. Therefore I shall restrict my
comments to these points. I shaJJ first outline some essential
differences Graham detects between sI anq s2. I shall then argue that
the two systems are not contradictory in the manner Graham suggests;
rather, S 2 is a deeper and more elaborate account which contains
all of the teachings of the 'higher-level' S 1 • In the terminology of
contemporary philosophy of science, S, is reducible to S 2 • Next, I shaU
turn to the shift in Aristotle's theory of explanation detected by
Graham. I shalJ claim that to strip the philosophy of science of S 2 of
the presuppositions of S 1 would be to have Aristotle abandon his ideal
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of ultimate explanation, and that there is no evidence that Aristotle was
eve r tempted to move in this direction.
Graham presents the theses of each of 'Aristotle's two systems' in a
succinct table (pp. 8o- 1). Here I shall mention only those theses
directly relevant to the discussion at hand.
The root difference bet\veen sI and s2 is one of ontology. In s"
which Graham calls Atomic Substantialism, the basic things in the
world are the primary substances of the Categories. These are those
concrete substances that we run across in our everyday experience:
biological entities and other middle-sized things which fall under
certain natural kinds (p. 26). In S 2 , which Graham calls Hylomorphic
Substantialism, the theoretically basic entities are no longer such
middle-sized concrete substances. Rather, concrete substances are
themselves to be analysed as complexes of form and matter, and,
according to Metaphysics Z, it is form tha t is ultimately to be identified
with primary substance ( pp. s8-62).
While both sI and s2 eSpOUSe the independence Of 'primary
substance', what is meant by this phrase differs in each of the two
theoretical discourses. In S , the term 'primary substance' refers to the
same beings as does the phrase 'concrete substance', which is the term
Graham employs in summarizing S 2 to refer to perceptible entities
such as Socrates. In S 2 it will not be the concrete substance Socrates
who serves as a foundation of being, but what S 2 wo uld consider the
corresponding 'primary substance, Socrates' form (p. 6o). Graham
expreSSeS the baSiC difference in the OntologieS Of s 1 and 5 2 by the
following principles: SA (belonging to S,), that 'primary s ubstances are
ontologically indivisible particulars', and H (belonging to 5 2 ) , that 'the
concrete substance is composed of form and matter' ( p. I 8o).
As G raham sees it, this difference in ontology has repercussions in
the p hilosophy of science. The central principle of the theory of
explanation of S 1 is labelled SK: 'scientific knowledge is demonstrative
knowledge. ' That is to say, scientific knowledge comes about through a
certain kind of deduction calJed a demons tration, whose premisses are
'self-evident' and exhibit the cause of the fact expressed in the
conclusion of the demonstration (pp. 47-8). Demonstrations are so
structured that this cause will be expressed in the demonstration's
middle term, 'the missing link in a chain of universals exhibited by the
terms of a sequence of syllogisms in a projected demonstrative proof'
(p. so). Since by and large those premisses which ultimately ground
demonstrations are definitional, expressing the essences of objects of
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scientific inquiry, demonstrations serve to identify the sort of cause
indicated in Post. An. 2. I I , 94a34-6, which Graham labels 'the
essential cause' .... Graham argues that, despite Aristotle's best efforts in
Post. A n. 2. I 1 to show otherwise, the essential cause is the only kind of
cause that can be made manjfest through the demonstrative scheme of
s, (pp. 158-63).
In S 2 , as Graham sees it, Aristotle adopts a deeper notion of
scientific explanation. In this system one adequately explains a fact
through identifying each of the four causes described in Phys. 2. 3·
According to Graham, the rigid notion of demonstrations grounded in
the identification of and deduction from essences plays no part here.
Rather, in this sort of explanation the relevant metaphysical aspects of
any enti ty, attribute, or event arc isolated and identified. Graham
argues that this notion of scientific explanation had to wait until S 2
because its scheme of the four causes is structured around the 'craft
model' which is the motivation of the metaphysics of S 2 • Graham
suggests that this is how one can so[ve a vexed problem of Aristotelian
scholarship: how to reconcile Aristotle's own prescriptions for
scientific research and exposition in the Posterior Ana~ytics with the
more discursive accounts actually presented in Aristotle's scientific
researches. According to Graham, Aristotle's scientific treatises are
part of S 2 , written at a time in whic h the S, theory of demonstration
was already obsolete (even if Aristotle himself was not aware that this
was so). What we find in these treatises is precisely what Aristotle in
Metaphysics A. 3 and Generation r~fAnimals 1. 1 says we should find:
the identification of each of the four causes responsible for the
phenomenon under con sideration ( pp. 3 19-23).

2.

Is Sz an extension of S,?

The crux of Graham's argument is that sI and s2are two incompatible
alternative philosophical systems. Graham first rejects the traditional
account of the relationship betvvecn the Organon and the rest of the
Aristotelian corpus, that which states that th e former is, as the name
Organon implies, a logical tool to be employed in any discourse
1
Graham distinguishe!> the 'essential cause' of S , from the ' formal cause' ofS , on the
grounds that the latte r norion is drpe nde nt on the corre lative no tions of matte r a nd f'orm ,
absent from S , (pp . 75-6).
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concerning any subject. According to this view, S, does not itself make
any substantive philosophic claims and he nce does not conflict with 5 2 •
Graham convincingly argues that the Categories does indeed present an
ontology: it gives an account of th e basic entities in th e world (primary
substances), derivative entities (the various kinds of accidents), and the
relations holding between these (pp. 87- 90).
Graham next r ejects what he calls the Extension Hypothesis,
concerning the relationship between s I and s2. According to this view,
5 2 is an extension of S, because '5 1 is only a preliminary statementeithe r because it is simplified for the novice or because it does not yet
take into account the full range of problems that a philosophy has to
confront' (p. 90). I shall h ere review Graham's criticism of the
Extension Hypothesis and in the light of this criticism defend a version
of it.
Graham's argument against th e Extension Hypothesis is as follows.
He writes, 'in logical theory, one system is an extension of the other if it
contains all the axioms of the other a nd at least one new axiom besides '
( p. 91 ). An example of this would be the relationship between plane
geometry and solid geometry. T he latter theory is built on the basis of
the former, but has a more encompassing subject-matter. T his is made
possible by additional axioms whklh deal with an expanded subj ectmatter without contradicting or replacing any of the axioms of the first
theory.s Graham argues that this cannot be the relation of S 1 and
s2 because a principle of sI' SA (that 'primary substances arc
ontologically indivisible particulars'), is not only absent from s2 but is
supplanted by the contradictory principle H (that 'the concrete
substance is composed of form and matter'). T wo systems whose
principles so contradict one another cannot stand in the relation of
theory and extension. Graham likens their relation to that between
Euclidean and Riemannian geom etries; each geometry is partially
based on an axiom concerning parallel lines which contradicts the
axiom of the other. They are incompatible alternatives. So, just as the
geometer must decide whether to adopt one geometry or another
within a given inquiry, the metaphysician must, within the context of a
certain philosophical inquiry, adopt either a theory according to wh ich
the concrete substance is ontologically indivisible or one according to
which it is not. Graham argues that problems of substantial change,
among other considerations, lead Aristotle to a th eory of the latter
~

C f. rhe definition of book r 1 of Euclid 's Eleme11ts.
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kind; once Aristotle has arrived at this theory, he can apply the
principles of the former theory only at the risk of contradicting himself.
It is certainly the case that principles SA and H are mutually
c~ntradictory, and hence S 1 cannot be an extension of S 2 in the sense
in which Graham has defined 'exte nsion'. But to posit a theoretical
chasm between the two theories is not the only alternative, and the fact
that Aristotle so deftly leaps from one theory to the other should make
us wary of Graham's proposal. Perhaps s2is an extension of sI in a
looser sense. Pe rhaps the root contradiction Graham detects between
S, and Sz is a function of the manner in which th e subj ect-matter ofS 1
is limited, and it may be that the metaphysical analysis of change that
prompts S 2 need not entail the rejection of the core doctrin es of S 1 • To
see how this is so we need to examine more closely the nature of the
contradiction to which Graham draws our attention.
In S 1 a certain kind, i.e. concre te substance, is posited as basic and
unanalysable. In S 2 that same kind is posited as analysable. Is not the
relation between concrete substance as conceived in S 1 and concrete
substance as con ceived in S 2 the same as that between the atom as
conceived in classical chemistry and tl1e atom as conceived in
contemporary physics? In both cases we have on the one hand a theory
in which a certain theoretical e ntity is posited as basic and
unanalysable and on the other hand a theory in which that same entity
is analysed as a complex of more basic theoretical entities. Although
we might not be able to properly say that contempora ry physics is an
extension of classicaJ chemistry, surely we would not want to make the
claim that Graham makes in regard to s I and s2: that they arc
incommensurable and incompatible. Rather, the relationship seems to
be that which holds between a scien ce or theory and that to which it is

reducible.
What is it for one theoretical system to be reducible to an other? If a
theory A is reducible to a theory B, one must be able to correlate those
entities taken to be basic in A with entities or complexes of entities
taken to be basic in B. Further, by means of these assumptions (which
express the relations holding between the theoretical entities of the two
systems) and the principles of B, one must be able to deduce every
theorem of A.'' Is this the relation that holds between the ontologies of
"See Ernest Nagel, 17u Struc/ure oj'Scimce ( ew York, 1961), 353- 4.
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S , and S/7 There will be only one 'correspondence rule'x relating the
ontologies ofS, and S 2 : that 'primary substance' as employed inS , has
the same reference as 'composite substance' in s2, the synthesis of
matter and form. That every primary substance faJls under a natural
kind and that such a kind is a species definable as genus and differentia
are theses of S, which, properly interpreted, will preserve their truthvalue in S 2 • T he only thesis of S, that will not preserve its truth-value
in S 2 is what Graham calls SA: that 'primary substances are
ontologically indivisible particulars'. What are we to make of this
principle (expressed in Cat. 5, 2a i1 -13, as 'primary substances arc
neither said of nor in anything else')?
The assertion that a certain entity posited by a theoretical discourse
is not analysable as a complex of more basic entities is not to be taken
as an integral principle of that discourse. For example, one wiJI not qua
arithmetician ide ntify the monad as the basic theoretical entity of
arithmetic. This wilJ be the task of the philosopher of science, such as
Aristotle (cf.Post.An. I. 1 , 71 01 15-16; I. 2, 72a21-4; I. 10, 76a3 4-6).
Similarly, that 'primary substance' is the basic theoretical entity of S 1 is
properly taken not as a thesis of S 1 itself, but of a meta theoretical
discourse explicating the logical structure of S 1 •
It might be countered that in this respect the status of a metaphysical
discourse is unique, for, unlike other sciences, metaphysics itself
purports to give the ultimate analysis of beings. But the notion of First
Philosophy is i'ntroduced only in S •. Except for the use of prole in
regard to concrete substances in the Categories, there is no indication
that the level of analysis presented therein is meant to be ultimate.
I conclude that all that S, tells us about the world is also told by S 2 ,
but s2tells us much more. Just as contemporary physics has deepened
the scientific understanding of the world offered by classical chemistry,
without rejecting classical chemistry as fundamentally incorrect, so
with S 2 Aristotle has deepened, not rejected, the metaphysical
understanding of the world offered by S,. The fact that the one system
takes a certain kind of entity to be basic while the other does not does
J restrict the discussion here of whether S, and S, are incommensurable to the area
in which Graham finds the core contradiction between them: ontology. T he apparent
incompatibility of the logic of the two systems (p. 8o) is also easily explained on the
grounds I present here. For a discussion of whether the philosophy of science of S, is
incompatible with rhat of S,., see sect. 3 below.
H On the usc of this phrase see W. Sellars, 'Theoretical Explanation', in P!Jilosqp!Jicnl
Perspectives (Springfield, Ill., 1967), 333·
7
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not entail the two systems' incompatibili ty. T h e propositiOn that a
certain theoretical entity cannot be further analysed need not be
considered an assumption withi11 a theory, but rather can be seen as a
fact regarding that th eory. If we take the S 1 principle of the ontological
indivisibility of concrete substance as metatheoretical in this way, the
fundamental contradiction G raham discerns between sI and s2
disappears.
Even if all of · the above is admitted, it might be countered that
Graham is still justified in writing of a major con ceptual rift between
early and later Aristotle. T he principles by which S 1 is supplemented
are so radical that S2 constitutes an entirely new world-view,
employing a different paradigm. Thus, Graham speaks of the
transition between sI and s2as a SCientific revolution, similar tO those
discussed by Kuhn .'1 On this view, there is such a conceptual rift
between the two systems that there would be no way to translate the
truths Of I intO the VOCabulary Of S 2 WithOUt doing Violence tO the
former. Because the first theory is part of a world-view rejected by
the second, the conceptual content of the principle of the first theory,
taken by itself, is different fro m the conceptual content of the first
theory understood as part of the more encompassing second theory. 10
Graham supports his view that there is a radical conceptual rift
between s, and s2by indica ting shifts in meaning in both the terms
and the propositions of the two systems. Graham foc uses on the
following example to highlight the incommensurability of the two
systems. According to th e ontology of the Categories, the fact that
Socrates is a substance entails that Socrates cannot be either more or
less what he is, since substance, taken as ontologically basic, does not
admit of the more or the less (Cat. 5, 3h33-43 1). But, as Graham
points out, in S 2 an immature Socrates would be 'less of a man', i.e.
less of a substance, than the mature Socrates. (As Aristotle puts it at
Melaph. H. 8, 1oso·'4-7, the adult is 'prior in form and substance'.
Because of the conceptual shift between S 1 and S 2 , the above S 1
statement, interpreted in the theoretical framework of S 2 , contradicts
the above statement ofS 2 (101-3). So even if partisans ofS 1 and S z
will agree with each other's statement that Socrates is a substance, that

s

' pp. 93-5 , 103. Sec T . Kuhn , The Structure ~~r Scient~/ic Rt"l}Q/utians, 2nd cdn.
(Chicago, 1970).
111 This point is based on my understanding of remarks made by G raham at the 1988
University of Texas at Austin Workshop in Ancient Philosophy.
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is only because they do not fully realize what the other side means by
that statement.
Does the problem not lie in the fact that 'to be more or less of a
certain substance' has not in this example been translated from the
idiom of one discourse to that of the other? Were the partisan of S 2 to
understand what the partisan of S 1 means when he denies the
possibility of one substance's being more or less a substance than
an other entity, surely he would have no objection. For in denying that
on~ man can be more or less a man t han another, all the partisan of S 1
means is that for every substantial kind, a particular entity either falls
under that kind or it does not. There is no concern here with the
extent to which certain potencies characteristic of that kind have been
actualized; as Graham points ·out, the notion of form as actuality is
alien to S. (pp. 98-1oo, 183-206). But this is not because the notion
contradicts anything in s.; it rather belongs to a deeper level of analysis.
Again, just because, within the the oretical structure of a system, an
analysis is neither given nor made possible, this does not mean that this
is entailed by the core of that system; rather, that there can be no such
analysis ought to be considered a mctatheoretical fact. The partisan of
S 2 would agree with the partisan ofS, that there is a sense in which no
one is either more or less human than another, but only 5 2 presents the
theoretical framework for discussing the difference in levels in which
certain potencies characteristic of substantial kinds are actualized. 11

3· Demonstration and explanation in S,
Graham argues that in the philosophy of science, as well as in
metaphysics, Aristotle's thought underwent a fundamental shift. The
notion of essen ce, which plays a crucial role in the theory of
explanation of S 1 , 12 is alien to the craft model of generation, which
11
Cf. the difference in the English idioms'" A is more of a man than B' and 'A is more
human than B'. While ir can be said that Tam 'more of a man' than my 1"\vo-year-old son,
to say that one being is more human than another is properly speaking impossible, lo r no
human being is more human than any otlllers. The idiom can be e mployed only
metaphorically, e.g. in saying that a human B acts like a robot, not displaying certain
human facu lties that are indeed possessed, or in say1ng that a creature A (e.g. a monkey)
djsplays abilities more like those of human beings than does crearurc B (e.g. a guineapig).
12 As Burnycat has argued, demonstrations are explanations: see M. F. Bumyeat,
'Aris tode on U nderstanding Knowledge' in E. Berti (ed.), A ristotl~ rm Sricnte: Ylu
Posterior Analytics (Padua, 1981), 97 -1 39· They are not mere linguistic entities; rathe r,
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motivates S 2 • Aristotle employs this model to liken the coming into
being of a substance to the imposition of form on appropriate matter.
In the most developed version of the theory of the four causes this
model is to be employed in scientific explanation. For every object of
inquiry the scie ntist must seek the analogues to the matter a craftsman
takes up, the form that is imposed on it, the craftsman himself, and the
end the craftsman has in mind (pp. 172-81). Aristotle attempts to
dovetail the two theories by identifYing the essence of a thing with its
formal cause. As we have seen, Graham holds this identification
partially responsible for the paradoxes of Metaphysics Z. 13
But suppose that Aristotle had adopted a hylomo:rphic substantialism
free of the theory of explanation presented in the Posterior Analytics.
What sort of scientific explanation would be possible? There are two
possibilities. Either explanation would be wholly non-deductive or it
would be deductive, without resting on indemonstrable first principles.
In the first case scientific explanation would come about merely
through the identification of each of the four causes, running down
them in a list, as it were. Any fact complex enough to be inexplicable
through the mere identification of the formal cause of some substances
would be in principle inexplicable. Take, for example, the biological
fact considered as explana·ndum in Post. An. 2. I 6-1 7= vines shed their
leaves. Aristotle sketches an explanation which would go something
like this: the structure of flat-leaved plants necessitates a congealing of
they are the vehicle by which there is imparted episteme (scienti fi c understanding), the
disposition required for answering certain 'why' questions. For this reason, Graham'
( p. 8 1) improperly assigns the thesis BTC ('a cause is an answer to the question Why') to
S. alone.
u Graham takes this identification to be responsible for two other philosophical
difficulties as well. The first is what he calls 'the e mpirical problem'. When actually
engaged in his biological researches Aristotle discovers that the ideas of definiing
biological kinds through identifying genus and species is unrealistic; in PA 1 . 2-4
Aristotle argues that a biological definition may need to present more than one
differentia (245-6). This does not strike me as evidence of the obsolescence of the S,
theory of explanation in the context of real empirical research. Rather, Aristotle is
making a relatively minor adjustment to the S, theory. The problem that Aristotle finds
in definitions arrived at through dichotomous divisions is that such definitions are
inadequate for grounding scientific ex'Pianations of the kath ' haura sumbebekora (the 'in
itself accidentals') of the defiuimda. On this see P. Pellegrin, Aristotle~~ C/assijimtirm of
Animalv: Bio/()KJ' and the Couctp!tltll Uni{)' of the A ris/()/elitlll Corpus, trans. A. Pre us
(Berkeley, 1 986), 13-49. So Aristotle is not here challenging the thesis that scicnti fie
explanations take the form of demonstrations based on indemonstrable definitions. The
second problem ('the analytic problem') concerns the ontological status of genus and
differentia. This does not seem to me to arise from the clash of contradicting systems; it
arises in S, alone.
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sap at the juncture of the Jeaf and th e stem; a vine is a flat- leaved plant,
so this coagulation will occur in a vine. This in turn will lead to the
vine's having its leaves drop towards the centre of the earth
(the explanation of which fact will presumably be drawn from the
principles of ch emistry). Much more is involved here than the simple
identification of each of the four causes. 14 T his explanation is
deductive.
Alternatively, scientific explanations in s2 could be deductive,
although not demonstrative. That is to say, they would be expressed by
inferences which do not rest on immediate premisses. Hence, the
premisses of these deductions would themselves demand explanation.
This would be to reject ultimacy in explanation, as most contemporary
philosophers of science have done. This bas the consequence of either
relegating such explanations to instruments allowing one to predict
future events, or of making the scientific understanding that such
explanations afford a relative affair; through them one would
understand more than before, but questions could still be raised
concerning the truths on which that explanation is grounded. There is
no evidence that Aristotle had contemplated any such position in his
philosophy of science. Even in S 2 he remains convinced of the ultimate
intelligibility of the important features of the sublunar realm. Given
this conviction, the fundamentals of the th eory of explanation offered
in S, must find a place in any system of hylomorphic substantialism.
I have here argued that there is no chasm separating S 1 from S 2 ; the
latter is rather the maturation of the former. D espite the negative tenor
of the above remarks, I would like to close by emphasizing what
is of great value in Grah am 's book. Although s I and s2 may
not be incommensurable, both are indeed comprehensive systems of
me taphysics and philosophy of science. Graham 's isolation of the
principles of the two is noteworthy; so is his account of how Aristotle
developed the principles of s2to meet philosophic demands for which
S 1 is inadequate. Although I have not here discussed these chapters of
Graham's book, they contain many intriguing and valuable argum ents
worthy of close conside ration.
Marquette University, Milwaukee
14 If we are lo adopt an 5 free of the presuppositions ofS, we could not even say that
1
this explanation has identified the formal cause of shedding. For in 5 1 , as Graham
conceives it, form has a role only as an ontological compone nt of s ubstance, and
shedding is not a substance.

